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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF U T A H ,

]
Plaintiff and, ;
Respondent, ]
])

vs.
CLARK LE ROY BERGESNON

Case N o . 20564

]

Defendant and ]
Appellant.
]

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

NATURE OF THE CASE
The plaintiff charged that defendant had committed a
second degree felony in the State of Utah.
defendant entered a plea of not guilty.

At arraignment, the

After plea bargaining,

the offense was reduced to a third degree felony and defendant
withdrew his not guilty plea and entered a plea of guilty.

DISPOSITON OF THE LOWER COURT
Based upon the guilty plea of the defendant, the court
entered a judgment that the defendant serve five (5) years in the
Utah State Penitentary and suspended sentence upon the terms that
the defendant enter into an agreement with Adult Probation and
Parole to abide by the probation agreement and to serve six (6)
months in the Box Elder County Jail.
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In February of 1981, a motion to set aside sentence of
court and resentence the defendant was heard and denied and in
November of 1984 a motion to set aside the guilty plea was filed
by the defendant and denied on February 26, 1985.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant, who appeals from the judgment of conviction
entered upon his plea of guilty and the order denying the
defendant's motion to set aside guilty plea, seeks the reversal
of his conviction, enforcement of his plea bargain or the vacating of his sentence as detailed in the argument portion of this
brief.

In the alternative and in the event this court concludes

that the record herein lacks facts essential to the proper and
complete disposition of the case, defendant seeks remand to the
District Court for an evidentiary hearing.
STATEMENTS OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether the prosecutor adhered to his promise to

recommend no incarceration.
2.

Whether it was proper for the court to accept a

guilty plea pursuant to a plea bargain and then sentence the
defendant contrary to the plea bargain without giving defendant
an opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea.
3.

Whether defendant's guilty plea was voluntary.

4.

Whether defendant was misled by the prosecutor

into believing his plea bargain would be accepted by the court.

.2.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
After the defendant's not guilty plea to the second
degree felony was entered, plea bargaining took place between the
Deputy Box Elder County Attorney, Mr. Jon Bunderson, and
defendant's counsel, Frank M. Wells.

The agreement reached, ac-

cording to defendant's counsel, is that the charge would be
reduced from a second degree to a third degree felony and the
county attorney would recommend to the court that the defendant
be placed on probation with no incarceration.

Mr. Bunderson told

the defendant's counsel that the prosecutor's office would make a
strong recommendation to the court that the defendant not be incarcerated and expressed the opinion that, while the recommendation of his office would not bind the court, he believed the
court would not act contrary to the recommendation.

Based upon

this assurance, the defendant, on May 19, 1980, entered a plea of
guilty to the reduced charge.
The transcript of the proceedings on the day the guilty
plea was entered clearly shows that there was no meeting of the
minds between the county attorney and defense counsel as to the
agreement reached as a result of plea bargaining.

The county at-

torney believed that the agreement was that a recommendation
would be made that the defendant not be imprisoned and it was the
understanding of defense counsel that the recommendation would be
that the defendant not be incarcerated.

(See transcript of the

proceedings of May 19, 1980, page 4, lines 5 through 11.)
.3.
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Believing that he had been betrayed by the county attorney and inadequately represented by his own counsel, the
defendant did not surrender himself to the Box Elder County
Sheriff on the date proscribed and, since that date, has been a
fugitive from justice.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The defendant contends that the prosecutor promised to
recommend to the court

that the defendant not be incarcerated

and be placed on probation if defendant would enter a guilty
plea.

At the time of the hearing, however, the prosecutor recom-

mended that the defendant not be imprisoned at the Utah State
Penitentiary.

Based upon the failure of the prosecutor to meet

his committment, it is claimed that the defendant's entry of a
guilty plea was not voluntary and should be set aside, that the
defendant should be allowed to enter a not guilty plea and the
case should be remanded to the District Court for trial.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE PROSECUTOR PROMISED TO RECOMMEND TO THE COURT
THAT THE DEFENDANT BE PLACED ON PROBATION WITHOUT
INCARCERATION AND DID NOT DO SO
As set forth in the Statement of Facts above, the
defendant withdrew his not guilty plea and entered a plea of
guilty based upon the promise made by the prosecutor that he
would recommend to the court that the defendant not be incar.4.
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cerated and be placed on probation under an agreement with Adult
Probation and Parole; however, at the time of the hearing, the
prosecutor recommended that the defendant not be imprisoned at
the Utah State Penitentary.
As a result of the failure of the prosecutor to fulfill
his commitment, defendant is entitled relief under the authority
of Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971), and United States
v. Brown, 500 F.2d. 374 (4th Cir. 1974).

In both cited cases,

convictions were reversed because of the failure of the
prosecutors to adhere to their promises as to what they would
recommend at the time of sentencing.
In Santobello v. New York, a new prosecutor apparently
ignorant of his predecessor's commitment to refrain from making a
sentencing recommendation instead recommended the maximum sentence of one (1) year for the defendant.
reversed the conviction.

The Supreme Court

Mr. Chief Justice Berger, writing for

the majority, stated:
This phase of the process of criminal justice and the
adjudicative element inherent in accepting a plea of
guilty, must be attended by safeguards to insure the
defendant what is reasonably due in the circumstances.
Those circumstances will vary, but a constant factor is
that when a plea rests in any significant degree on a
promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can
be said to be part of the inducement or consideration,
such promise must be fulfilled. 404 U.S. at 262.
In United States v. Brown, the defendant entered into a
plea bargain whereby he pleaded guilty to the charge of possession of stolen mail in consideration for dismissal of a forgery
.5.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

charge and a recommendation by the government that he receive a
sentence of three (3) years to be served at Lorton concurrently
with the unexpired portion of another sentence.

He was, instead,

sentenced to a term of four (4) years without recommendation that
it be served at Lorton.

At sentencing, a prosecutor other than

the one who entered into the plea bargain merely brought the plea
bargain to the attention of the court but made no recommendation
as had been promised.

The Court of Appeals reversed on the

ground that the MHalf-heartedn recommendation of the new
prosecutor did not comply with the plea bargain and that it made
no difference that defense counsel had brought the reasons for
the plea bargain to the attention of the sentencing court. Holding that the effect on the sentencing court of the noncompliance
with the plea bargain was n a matter into which we need not
inquire," the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for sentencing in accordance with the prosecutorfs recommendation.

Calling

such action necessary for specific enforcement of the plea bargain to which the defendant was entitled, the court wrote:
In determining significance of the prosecutor's failure to
fulfill the promise contained in the plea bargain in
Santobello, the Supreme Court did not inquire into the
reasons for the breach; nor do we. We have no reason to
think that the bargain was breached as a result of anything
more than the failure of the first prosecutor in inform the
second, and the second's complete candor in responding to
the inquiry of the District Court. But in Santobello, hinging reversal on the breach of the agreement alone, the court
attached no weight to the fact that the failure to comply
with the plea bargain had been inadvertent.
The staff lawyers in the prosecutor's office have
the burden of 'letting the left hand know what the
right hand is doing1 or has done. That the breach
,6.
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of agreement was inadvertent does not lessen its
impact, 404 U.S. at 262, 92 S.Ct. at 499.
The test established to be applied by us is thus an objective one - whether the plea bargain agreement has
been breached or not - irrespective of prosecutorial
motivations or justifications for failure in
performance. 500 F.2d at 378.
The failure by the prosecutor to recommend to the court
that defendant be placed on probation prior to the court entering
judgment on defendant here went to the very heart of the plea
bargain, namely that probation would be recommended and that the
recommendation of the prosecutor would be accepted and enforced
by the district court.

In this respect, the prosecutor's lapse

was even more basic than those in Santobello and Brown, which
went to the content of the recommendation to the court.
Therefore, the defendant here is entitled to the relief ordered
by Santobello and Brown.

POINT II
IT WAS IMPROPER FOR THE DISTRICT COURT TO ACCEPT A GUILTY
PLEA PURSUANT TO A PLEA BARGAIN AND THEN SENTENCE CONTRARY
TO THE PLEA BARGAIN WITHOUT GIVING DEFENDANT AN OPPORTUNITY
TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA
Defendant's counsel and the prosecutor engaged in negotiations culminating in a plea bargain whereby defendant pleaded
guilty.

Under these circumstances, the court should have been

advised of the plea bargaining.

The court would thereafter be

obliged to follow the prosecutor's recommendation or inform
defendant that it would not do so and allow him an opportunity to
.7.
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withdraw his plea.

The failure of the court to permit defendant

to withdraw his plea of guilty requires this court to vacate
defendant's sentence and remand the case for sentencing in accordance with the prosecutor's recommendation.

See Santobello v.

New York and United States v. Brown.

POINT 111
DEFENDANT'S CHANGE OF PLEA WAS BASED UPON THE ASSURANCES OF
THE PROSECUTOR AND WAS, THEREFORE, NOT VOLUNTARY
At the time that defendant withdrew his not guilty plea
and entered a plea of guilty, the court asked the defendant if he
had been promised anything if he entered a plea of guilty.

The

court also asked the defendant if he understood that the court
was not bound by agreements made between the prosecutor and
defense counsel.

(Transcript of Proceedings P.4)

The ritual assertion by the court that it was not bound
by the plea bargain does not offset an otherwise misleading
impression.

This was the holding in Walters v. Harris, 460 F.2d

988 (4th Cir. 1972), cert, denied, 409 U.S. 1129 (1973).
Walters, a petitioner under 28 U.S.C. Section 2255, claimed that
he was induced into pleading guilty by the prosecutor's unkept
promise that he would receive a ten-year sentence and that he had
been sentence to twenty-years in prison instead.
stated:

.8.
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This court

If Walters was in fact promised by the Assistant United
States Attorney that he would receive a ten-year
sentence, he is entitled to relief. United States v.
Carter, 454 F.2d. 426 (4th Cir. 1972). Sentencing Walters was within the authority of no one but the trial
judge. An assurance by another that Walters would
receive a particular sentence, therefore, would be a
promise that could not be kept. An unkept bargain
which has induced a guilty plea is grounds for relief.
Santobello v. New York, 404, U.S. 257, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30
L.Ed 2d 427 (1971). 460 F.2d at 991-92.
At arraignment, the trial court questioned Walters closely as to
whether anyone had made any promises to him.

The Court then

THE COURT: Do you fully understand that the court, and
the court alone, is responsible under the law for any
sentence that is imposed upon a defendant who pleads
guilty or if found guilty, do you fully understand
that?
DEFENDANT:

Yes, sir.

Id. at 992.

As to the significance of the quoted question and answer, the
court stated:
It is doubtful that the trial judge's instruction that
the length of Walters1 sentence was within his sole
control would have eradicated the effect of the
prosecutor's alleged promise to Walters. Ibid.
The court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case for
further factual inquiry by the district court.

POINT IV
DEFENDANT WAS MISLEAD BY THE PROSECUTOR INTO BELIEVING HIS
PLEA BARGAIN WOULD BE ACCEPTED BY THE COURT
As detailed in the Statement of Facts above, defendant
was mislead by the prosecutor into believing that the court would
.9.
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accept his plea bargain.

As a result of the misleading impres-

sion which was conveyed to him, defendant entered his plea of
guilty.

The actions of the prosecutor require the specific en-

forcement of defendant's plea bargain as set forth in Clemons v.
United Sates, 137 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1943).

In Clemons, the

defendant was assured by an Assistant United States Attorney that
the indictment on which he went to trial charged only a misdemeanor and that the maximum sentence was one (1) year.

The

trial judge, however, construed the indictment as charging a
felony and, after conviction, imposed a sentence of four (4)
years.

On appeal, the court of appeals held that the

prosecutor's assurances to the defendant as to the possible future punishment in the event of conviction required reversal and,
in addition, rejected the government's argument that the defendant was not prejudiced since he was convicted after trial. The
court wrote:
It may well be that Clemons and his counsel acted a bit
precipitately in accepting this assurance at its face
value and in proceeding accordingly. It does not follow that they, therefore, acted altogether
unreasonably. Certainly, the whole procedure smacks of
surprise, which should if possible be avoided.
A criminal trial is not, of course, to be likened to a
game. . . We think accordingly, that Clemons, under the
circumstances of this case, was deprived of his liberty
against the spirit, if not the letter, of the Due
Process Clause of the Constitution of the United
States. We think he has been dealt with unfairly in
the light of our standards of justice towards those accused of federal crimes - standards, in our opinion,
which the courts must always- adequately safeguard and
must, under all circumstances, zealously protect. 137
F.2d. at 305-306.
.10.
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CONCLUSION
As a result of the errors commited below, defendant
respectfully submits that he is entitled to relief as follows:
RELIEF
ERROR
I.
Failure of Prosecutor
Set aside defendant's guilty
to Recommend Probation
plea and sentence; in the alternative, remand for an evidentiary hearing.
II.

Failure to Sentence
Defendant in Accordance with Plea Bargain

III. Defendant's Change
of Pleas was Not Voluntary

Specific enforcement of plea
bargain; in the alternative,
remand for an evidentiary
hearing.
Set aside defendant's guilty
plea and sentence; in the alternative remand for an evident iaryOhearing.
Resp/ct/ui:

lits^ted,

CHOMA'S / V' BLOWiUI ST
40 South Sixth/East
Salt Lake C%v/,
Utah 841.#2
ADDENDUM
Accompanying this brief are the two orders sought to be
reviewed.

They are:
1.

Order Denying Motion To Set Aside Sentence, dated

May 2 1 , 1981
2.

Order Denying Defendant's Motion To Set Aside

.11.
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Guilty Plea, dated February 20, 1985

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY

I hereby certify that I delivered &*-&)
&ro (2) true
true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to:
David L. Wilkinson
Attorney General for the
State of Utah
State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
t h i s / i ^ d ay of November, 1985.

Thoma-S'R.

Blorjquist
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A t t o r n e y a t Law
4 5 North F i r s t East
Brighara C i t y , Utah
Telephone: 734-9464

IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

:
STATE OF UTAH
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO SET
Plaintiff
ASIDE SENTENCE
vs.
CIARK LEROY BERGESON

Criminal Number

1940

Defendant*

Defendant in this iLatter has filed a Motion To Set Aside the Sentence
of the Court, seeking a resentencing of the defendant.

Plaintiff filed

a Memorandum in Opposition thereto, and pursuant to stipulation of the
parties, defendant was granted time to respond to the plaintiff's
memorandum, and the time now having expired, and the matter having therefore
been submitted by the parties for decision, and based upon jthe files and
records of the Court, and the Motions and Memorandums of the parties, and
good cause appearing therefore, it is hereby ordered, adjudged, and
decreed as follows:
1.

The Court finds the sentence to be legal and proper, and

therefore denies defendants motion.

Dated t h i s

^

day of

/)7/ty<
^

> 1981.

VeNoy Christerfofferson, District Judge

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order denying Motion to Set Aside Sentence to Mr. Thomas R. Blonquist,
Attorney for the defendant, Second Floor, Metropolitian Law Building, 431
South 3rd East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, postage prepaid, this ^/

of )

7/

-

day

, 1981.

£

/7

7
/-A

/• > < -t&>x- A7

—n
-y

Secretary
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t<~*-'^yu,-*\.

THOMAS R. BLONQUIST A0369
Attorney for Defendant
40 South Sixth East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 5330525
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR BOX ELDER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

;
Plaintiff,

v

-

CLARK LE ROY BERGESON,
Defendant.

])

Criminal No. 1940

]>

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT"S
MOTION TO SET ASIDE
GUILTY PLEA

))
')

The above matter came before the Court pursuant to the
Motion of the Defendant to Set Aside Guilty Plea.

Plaintiff

was represented by John J. Bunderson and Defendant was
represented by Thomas R. Blonquist.

The matter was submitted

to the Court on memorandums and having taking the matter
under advisement to consider the material submitted by the
parties and having done so and being fully advised in the
premises, the Court issued a Memorandum Decision on January
9, 1985, and based thereupon and good cause appearing therefor
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendant's
Motion to Set Aside Guilty Plea be and the same hereby is
denied.
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DATED this ^/y^day of February, 1985,
BY THE COURT:

i<c

OMER J. CALL -DISTRICT JUDGE

The undersigned hereby declares that he caused a copy
of the foregoing to be mailed, postage prepaid, to John
Bunderson, Attorney at Law, 45 North First East, Brigham
City, Utah 84302 this j£ day of February, 1985.
/

K /—fa
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